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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between
demographics and the frequency of censored posts
(weibos) on Sina Weibo. Our results indicate that
demographics such as location, gender and paid for
features do not provide a good degree of predictive
power but help explain how censorship is applied
on social media. Using a dataset of 226 million
weibos collected in 2012, we apply a binomial
regression model to evaluate the predictive quality of
user demographics to identify candidates that may be
targeted for censorship. Our results suggest male users
who are verified (pay for mobile and security features)
are more likely to be censored than females or users who
are not verified. In addition, users from provinces such
as Hong Kong, Macao, and Beijing are more heavily
censored compared to any other province in China over
the same period.

1.

Introduction

China has censored its internet since 1994 when it
issued the first regulations that the internet could not be
used to harm the interests of the state [1]. Censorship
in China has grown in breadth and depth such that
the Human Rights Watch declared in their 2020 World
Report that, “China’s government sees human rights
as an existential threat.”[2] Recent political events in
China bring this into focus. Protests in Hong Kong
are being stymied by the the Great Firewall, preventing
effective coordination and communication [3]. China
also exerts influence on international companies, such
as forcing Apple to remove apps that it doesn’t like
from it’s Chinese Apple Store [4], or spreading false
information through Twitter [5]. These are just a few
recent examples of China’s influence on the internet.
China employs a widely distributed censorship
policy that spans across social, political, and
technological spheres. Recent political developments
in China have sparked growing concerns regarding
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Internet freedom for citizens as many foreign tech
companies withdraw from Hong Kong or refuse
Chinese governmental requests to share their users data
[6, 7]. The Chinese government expects servers hosting
online content to censor users by whatever means they
deem fit, as long as they accomplish the government’s
goals. As such, the specific mechanisms that are used
vary across social media and newscasting platforms [8].
One effective method of censorship is to track heavy
offenders with a large number of followers to facilitate
the removal of objectionable content [9].
The increase and continuous expansion of Internet
censorship practices by oppressive political agendas
warrant further research to understand characteristics
that trigger automated methods of information control.

2.

Prior Work

Censorship in China is a well studied phenomenon
because of the direct effect it has on freedom
of expression, freedom from being oppressed by
the government, and freedom of retribution by the
government.
Prior research has sought to better understand what
words are being censored. It was found that predictors
for censorship were related to political scandals, the
one child policy, housing policy, the pension system,
political events, leaders of the communist party, officials
names, content deletion itself, and profanity. [10]
Other studies found that negative sentiment, average
number of idioms in each sentence, number of content
word categories, number of idioms, number of complex
semantic categories and verbs increase the probability of
being censored. While positive sentiment, words related
to leisure, reward and money decease the probability of
being censored.[11] The theory being that posts with
complex ideas have a higher idea of being censored.
It was also shown that the number of followers effect
deletion rates and the dissemination of information. [9]
On a higher conceptual level, a seminal paper
by King et al. showed that there was no statistical
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difference between posts critical and supportive of the
state (the State Critique Theory) when conditioning
on high profile events (for instance Bo Xilai scandal).
Rather posts that had the potential for citizens to meetup
and form groups had a significantly higher probability
of being censored than posts that did not, (the Collective
Action Potential Theory). [12, 13].
The implication of King et al. is that the main aim
of censorship is to prevent groups from forming. This
makes sense in the broader context of Chinese history
because it has a long history of increased censorship and
tightened governmental controls immediately following
riots or other incidents involving groups of people. The
most famous example is the Tienanmen Square Incident,
which arguably began the modern era of heavy Chinese
censorship.
These papers constitute part of the core of the
modern academic corpus of censorship in China. But
surprisingly they fail to report basic demographics
which is information that may be useful for a
more robust understanding of the mechanisms behind
censorship.
To our knowledge there is only one paper that tackles
this issue. Bamman et al. computed deletion rates of
users in each different province in order to estimate rates
of censorship. A major limitation of their work is that it
is impossible to tell if a post was deleted by the user
for fear of governmental retribution, by governmental
censors, or for other reasons.[14]
We overcome the limitations of Bamman et al.
by using posts that are known to be censored. We
also expand upon it by including gender, geographic
location, and whether users have paid for premium
features. We conjecture that in addition to having a large
number of followers, user demographics may also be
used to increase filtering relevancy.

3.

Methods

The dataset in this paper is from the Open
Weiboscope Data Access [15] project that is funded by
the University of Hong Kong Seed Funding Program for
Basic Research. This project’s aim is to make publicly
available censored posts from selected microbloggers in
order to promote a free internet and academic research.
The authors of this paper have no association with this
organization, and did not personally collect the data.
The data was collected in 2012 from Sina Weibo,
a Chinese analogue to Twitter.
We chose this
dataset because Sina Weibo was the largest online
micro-blogging website at that time and because its large
size ensures a good representation of the population.
In order to construct this dataset, a list of users who

have more than 1000 followers was collected. The
original list contained 350,000 users. This list was added
to by random sampling. The dataset contains roughly 14
million unique users.
Every day a sample of users timelines was
downloaded and compared to previous saved timelines.
If a previous post is not on the current timeline, the post
was either deleted by the user or censor.
The post was then searched for by Message ID. If the
result is ”This weibo does not exist.” That means it was
deleted by the user. If the result is ”Permission Denied”
then the post was removed by the censor.
The dataset contains 226 million weibos, 86
thousand of which are known to be censored. Each
row of the dataset contains the weibo posted, and
information about each weibo, including an alpha
numeric user identification code that has been pseudo
randomly generated to protect the identity of individuals
[10].
Along with the above dataset, an ancillary dataset
with information about each pseudo random ID
was available.
This includes three self reported
demographics: province, sex, and verified status.
Province is a categorical variable with 36 distinct levels,
one for each province code plus one for “Other”. Sex
is male or female, and verified status is whether the
individual has paid for extra service, including status
showoff, extra functions, mobile and security features.
This data was retrieved through use of the Sina Weibo
Open API and reflects self reported data.
The data came in the form of 52 comma separated
files, each containing a weeks worth of weibos, and
their corresponding information. Each file was initially
processed in order to collect and condense the relevant
variable for this analysis, then condensed into a single
large file containing the entire years worth of weibos.
This was accomplished by the use of a processing cluster
with high memory availability.
For each user ID, the number of times that user
was censored over the course of 2012 was tabulated.
The censored count variable was combined with the
ancillary dataset, to give a single dataset that has
each pseudo random ID with demographics for that
individual and the number of times they were censored.
The province variable contained 47 codes that matched
with 36 provinces codes, with 11 ambiguous levels [16].
Out of roughly 14 million rows, there were 12 thousand
ambiguous responses that didn’t code to any of the
province codes. These were coded to “Other”.
Due to the fact that the vast majority of users
were never censored, the censored count variable was
collapsed into the binary variable censored or not
censored. The censored level of this variable represents
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the number of people that were censored at least once
over the year, and the not censored level represents the
number of people that were never censored over the
same period.
For efficient processing, identical rows of the three
demographics were tabulated and two separate columns
were created, one for the number of times censored and
one for the number of times not censored. This scheme
condensed roughly 14 million rows into 144 rows.

3.1.

Table 3.3. By Sex and Verified

Male
False
True
False
True

Table 3.1. Probability Of Being Censored

Posts Censored
Zero
One or Greater

Users
13808789
11214

p(Posts Censored)
0.99919
0.00081

A preliminary analysis of user demographics against
counts shows some expected trends. Province, summed
across sex and verified for conciseness, are shown in
Table 3.2. The three highest are Hong Kong, Beijing
and Overseas. In Table 3.4 the sex of censored users
is shown, with males being much more likely to be
censored. Table 3.5 shows the probability of verified
users vs non verified users to be censored. Verified users
are much more likely to be censored than non verified.
And lastly, the interaction of sex and verified is shown
in Table 3.3. It is not clear if sex and verified status is
an interaction, if verified male users are different than
male non verified users, or if female verified users are
different than female non verified users.

p(Censored)
0.000098
0.000408
0.030360
0.061107

Table 3.4. By Sex

Sex
Male
Female

Descriptive Statistics

A summary of the censored variable is in Table 3.1.
This shows the variable collapsed into two levels, users
that were never censored and users that were censored
at least once over the period.

Verified
False
False
True
True

p(Censored)
0.001576
0.000313

and Verified. The response variable has two levels which
suggests logistic regression modeled as binomial counts.
The form of the regression equation is suggested by the
descriptive statistics in Section 3.1. Province is additive
and Sex and Verified status is an interaction.
Binomial regression with a logit link function was
chosen. We set Ci to be the number of censored users
on row i, and Ti for the total number of users for row i.
Also, M is categorical for male or not male (female). V
is for verified or not verified. There is also categorical
Pj for j = 1, 2, . . . , 36 for each province/administrative
district/other. The demographics for row i have βm
for Male, βv for Verified, and βmv for the interaction
Male:Verified. For each Province, there is a βPj C is
Binomial, with size T and probability λ, where λ is
the logit transformed linear transformation of all our
predictors.

Ci ∼ Binomial(Ti , λi )
λi =

1
1 + e−X

Xi = βI + βm Mi + βv Vi + βmv Mi Vi
Table 3.2. By Province

3.2.

Province
Hong Kong
Beijing
Overseas
Taiwan
..
.

p(Censored)
0.003749
0.003557
0.001236
0.000988
..
.

Ningxia
Qinghai

0.000166
0.000123

Binomial Model

The form of the model equation was then
determined. The response variables are Censored and
Not Censored, and the predictors are Province, Male,

+ βP1 P1i + βP2 P2i
+ · · · + βP36 P36i

This model is fit with Huber robust errors to
account for heteroskedasticity through the R package
’robustbase’[17]. The city of Beijing was set to be the
reference level or the categorical variable Province.
Logistic regression was chosen for two reasons.
First, a statistical method that returns standard errors
Table 3.5. By Verified Status

Status
Verified
Not Verified

p(Censored)
0.050269
0.000223
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was desired in order to establish the significance of the
predictors. Second, the meaning of logistic regression
coefficients are widely known which enhances the
interpretability and communication of results.

4.

Results

Table A.1 shows the regression summary. The
main effects for Verified and Sex are highly significant
while the interaction term for Verified and Sex is also
significant. This means that while Sex and Verified have
different values for each combination of the values of
their levels.
The marginal effects for the interaction between
Male and Verified are in Figure 4.1, and the marginal
effect of Province is in Figure 4.2. The marginal
effects summaries are in Table A.3 and A.2. While
the regression summary shows the effect on the logit
transformed Censored variable, the marginal effects
show the probability of being censored at least once for
a random member of the given category.
These marginal tables are different from the
descriptive statistics in Section 3.1 because they show
the probability of being censored after the effect of the
other categories are removed.
Verified males have the highest probability of being
censored at least once (.04 ± .002, 95% CI). Females
who are verified have roughly half that amount (.018 ±
.001, 95% CI). Unverified members have a much lower
probability of being censored (Males .0003 ± .00002,
Females 0.00008 ± 0.000006, 95% CI). The highest
location to be censored is Overseas (.0061 ± .0006, 95%
CI) followed by Hong Kong, Beijing and Macao (.006 ±
.0006, .005 ± .0002, and .004 ± .002, 95% CI’s). The
least censored province is Qinghai (0.0009 ± 0.0008,
95% CI).

4.1.

Figure 4.1. Male:Verified

Model Validation

To validate these models for inference purposes,
what is required is to ensure that there is no systemic
bias or patterns in the residuals. To do this we follow
the procedure given by Gelman and Hill.[18] We divide
the fitted values into categories with an equal number of
points. The particular number of values is somewhat
arbitrary but Gelmen recommends the square root of
the number of values. Rounded down, this is 12 for
our dataset. These bins are then plotted as the average
residual value by the average
p fitted for that bin. The
expected bounds are ±2 p(1 − p)/n, as p ranges as
from 0 to 1. If more than 5% of the average residual
by average fitted value for each bin lies outside the
expected bounds, the model is suspect. We expect 95%
of the points to lay inside the bounds because the above

Figure 4.2. Province
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formula for the bounds is a confidence interval normal
estimate of a proportion at a 95% confidence level. In
our case, we should expect 12*.05=.6, or no more than
one point outside the bounds, preferably none.[18]
In Figure 4.3 we show the average binned residual
by binned average fitted. For this model there are a large
number of points on top of each other at zero fitted and
zero residual. This was to be expected as that is true
to the underlying data. There are no points outside the
bounds, as evidenced by Figure 4.3
Figure 4.3. Residuals by Fitted

We also performed a leave one out cross validation.
The decision boundary was chosen such that it
maximized the product of precision and recall. The
decision boundary that maximizes this product is
.022. This low value is to be expected because an
overwhelming majority of the underlying dataset were
not censored. The confusion matrix is in Table 4.1.
Precision is 0.056 and recall is .69 for the positive label
Censored.
Table 4.1. Confusion Matrix for Boundary .022

Actual:Predicted
Not Censored
Censored

5.

Not Censored
13465940
3509

Censored
129092
7705

Discussion

The precision and recall of the model is very low for
the label Censored. This is to be expected with the very
low predictive power of the categories, as can be seen in
the descriptive statistics in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Because
of the very high imbalance, few categories, and low
power of those categories, no classifier can produce a

high precision value, given the predictors. We therefore
reject this model for prediction, not for lack of fit or
a better possible model, but because better predictive
ability is not possible with this dataset. Even an overfit
model would have poor predictive ability. For instance,
the row with the highest probability of censorship is
11 %, making this an unobtainable upper bound for
precision.
This model is still valid for inference, as Figure 4.3
shows no systematic bias. The interaction between sex
and verification status is significant by Table A.1, so
looking at sex and verified independently is not justified.
Referring to the margins Figure 4.1, male verified users
are most likely to be censored over the year 2012. It
is possible that male verified users are more likely to
post offensive things to the government. Female verified
users have the marginal probability just under half as
much as male verified users. Unverified users both male
and female have a much lower marginal probability. It
may be possible that more active users become verified
and as such are more likely to be censored.
In Figure 4.2, it is shown that the locations most
likely to be censored are Oversees, Macao, Hong Kong,
Other, and Beijing. This makes sense as these areas
are much more politically sensitive. Macao and Hong
Kong has a very long history of protests and political
divisiveness from the rest of China. On the other hand
the province with the lowest probabilities of a user being
censored is Qinghai and Ningxia, which has a history of
Tibetan monk immolation, and Hui and Uighurs ethnic
group tensions respectively.
While every province has some history of unrest,
this analysis only shows the relationship between the
self-reported demographics and the probability of a user
being censored at least once. It only shows how any
unrest is reflected in the number of people censored, and
so is a better measure of how ubiquitous censorship is
among these demographics, as opposed to the depth of
or intensity of censorship.
Also, it may be possible that instead of these
demographics correlating with qualities that make users
more likely to make posts that will be censored, the
censors filter by gender, verified status, and location to
reduce the computational effort and sharpen the focus of
who to censor. It is impossible to tell which of these two
hypothesises are true by this dataset.
The results of data analysis on a sample can only
be generalized to the population if the sample is large
enough and the data generating process did not bias the
sample. Out of the roughly 14 million users in the study,
350,000 were selected due to high follower count. The
rest was a simple random sample. This may slightly bias
the results towards users with more than 1000 followers.
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6.

Limitations of this Work

The main limitation of this work is the age of
the dataset. The dataset was collected over 2012 and
constitutes the censorship at that time. The paramount
leader at that time was Hu Jintao, who many considered
to be reserved. The nature and intensity of censorship
took a turn in 2013 when Xi Jingping became paramount
leader. This dataset does not reflect all the changes
in censorship that was to happen over the next decade
under Xi Jinping. But may serve as a way-point in
understanding the demographics of censorship at that
time. Future research will focus on investigating the
evolution of censorship when a similar more recent
dataset becomes available.
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Appendices
A.

Table A.2. Marginal Effect of Sex and Verified

Results
Table A.1. Logistic Regression

(Intercept)
MaleTrue
VerifiedTrue
MaleTrue:VerifiedTrue
ProvinceOther
ProvinceTianjin
ProvinceHebei
ProvinceShanxi
ProvinceInner Mongolia
ProvinceLiaoning
ProvinceJilin
ProvinceHeilongjiang
ProvinceShanghai
ProvinceJiangsu
ProvinceZhejiang
ProvinceAnhui
ProvinceFujian
ProvinceJiangxi
ProvinceShandong
ProvinceHenan
ProvinceHubei
ProvinceHunan
ProvinceGuangdong
ProvinceGuangxi
ProvinceHainan
ProvinceChongqing
ProvinceSichuan
ProvinceGuizhou
ProvinceYunnan
ProvinceTibet
ProvinceShaanxi
ProvinceGansu
ProvinceQinghai
ProvinceNingxia
ProvinceXinjiang
ProvinceTaiwan
ProvinceHong Kong
ProvinceMacao
ProvinceOverseas

logit(Censored)
-9.05
1.62
5.91
-0.83
0.15
-1.03
-0.93
-1.16
-0.97
-1.01
-1.34
-1.19
-0.31
-0.89
-0.73
-0.86
-0.98
-0.97
-0.82
-0.81
-0.87
-0.66
-0.48
-1.27
-0.33
-0.56
-0.68
-0.93
-0.79
-0.56
-0.73
-0.38
-1.47
-1.77
-0.94
-1.06
-0.02
-0.00
0.11

SE
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.05
0.12
0.11
0.17
0.18
0.09
0.19
0.16
0.04
0.06
0.05
0.10
0.08
0.13
0.07
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.03
0.15
0.13
0.09
0.07
0.17
0.12
0.33
0.10
0.15
0.50
0.44
0.17
0.16
0.05
0.26
0.05

Male
False
True
False
True

Verified
False
False
True
True

p(Censored)
0.0000766
0.0003144
0.0184836
0.0401515

SE
0.0000033
0.0000102
0.0006523
0.0011171

Table A.3. Marginal Effect of Province

Province
Overseas
Hong Kong
Beijing
Macao
Other
Shanghai
Hainan
Gansu
Chongqing
Guangdong
Tibet
Hunan
Taiwan
Sichuan
Shaanxi
Zhejiang
Yunnan
Shandong
Henan
Jiangsu
Hubei
Anhui
Xinjiang
Guizhou
Hebei
Fujian
Jiangxi
Liaoning
Inner Mongolia
Shanxi
Tianjin
Heilongjiang
Guangxi
Jilin
Ningxia
Qinghai

p(Censored)
0.0061
0.0060
0.0050
0.0041
0.0041
0.0032
0.0031
0.0029
0.0028
0.0023
0.0023
0.0023
0.0022
0.0022
0.0021
0.0021
0.0019
0.0019
0.0019
0.0019
0.0018
0.0018
0.0017
0.0017
0.0016
0.0016
0.0016
0.0016
0.0016
0.0015
0.0015
0.0013
0.0012
0.0011
0.0009
0.0009

SE
0.0003
0.0003
0.0001
0.0010
0.0002
0.0001
0.0004
0.0004
0.0002
0.0001
0.0007
0.0002
0.0003
0.0001
0.0002
0.0001
0.0002
0.0001
0.0002
0.0001
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0.0002
0.0001
0.0003
0.0002
0.0002
0.0002
0.0002
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
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